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Why NEAR

NEAR is what makes the safety guarantees possible.

AI in a trusted enclave writes the guard. Aurora enforces it cheaply. A NEAR key that can only tighten handles emergencies on every chain.

  1. 1 · AnalyzeNEAR AI Cloud

    Nobody can quietly swap the model that wrote your rules.

    Two independent AI models draft the invariants inside a hardware enclave (TEE) on NEAR AI Cloud. Each run records which models it used and the enclave’s attestation. Where the models disagree, the rule comes to you. The AI never decides alone: your team approves every rule.

  2. 2 · EnforceAurora, NEAR’s EVM

    Checking every single transaction is affordable.

    The guard runs its checks inside each transaction, after your protocol’s own code. On Aurora those checks cost fractions of a cent, so nothing has to be sampled or skipped. The same guard runs on Base Sepolia.

  3. 3 · RespondMethod-scoped NEAR keys

    The monitor can only make your protocol safer.

    The monitor’s NEAR key is a function-call key limited to one method on the Kronos registry: tighten. NEAR itself rejects any other call from that key. A stolen key cannot loosen a limit or move funds.

  4. 3 · RespondNEAR Chain Signatures

    One NEAR key protects every chain. We never hold an EVM key.

    Each protocol gets an EVM address controlled by NEAR’s MPC network. In an emergency the registry builds the tighten transaction itself, the MPC network signs it, and it is sent to the guard on Aurora and on Base. The guard reverts anything that is not tighter than before.

Check it yourself

These are public testnet records, not screenshots.

The sample lowered an outflow threshold from 200,000 to 100,000. Its sender is an address no private key exists for outside NEAR’s MPC network.

Not built yet

Pause and cap changes across chains
Recorded on the NEAR registry today. Not yet signed onto EVM chains: Chain Signatures covers outflow tightens only.
NEAR Intents
Not used today. Planned for cross-chain settlement of queued withdrawals.
Proofs of attestations
Attestations are signed today, not proven. Proving them is future work.
Mainnet
Everything here runs on testnet: Aurora testnet, Base Sepolia and NEAR testnet.

What Kronos can’t stop

  • Phishing: a user signing a malicious intent
  • Stolen exchange or wallet keys
  • Bugs in a chain’s own software
  • Bugs in the invariants themselves

Keep audits and fork tests in your release process.

Protect a protocolSee the three layers